Unintended consequences in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Bosnia's borders were not intended to be international when they were established in the 1940s, yet that is precisely what happened in 1992. Similarly the internal divisions in Bosnia that were drawn up by international overlords in the 1990s may in time gain much more significance than was originally intended. 

The internal divisions of Yugoslavia were decided during the Second World War and its aftermath. They were based on straightforward historical precedents, but some issues were debated. The border between Croatia and Serbia was largely based on a previous one, but adjusted for ethnic reasons. Had these adjustments not been made, the previously Croatian areas that were allocated to Serbia probably would have suffered the same devastation as eastern Slavonia in Croatia, the scene of the most bitter fighting during the Croatian war of 1991. In negotiations over Bosnia’s borders, Muslims had advocated attaching the Muslim-populated Sandzak region to Bosnia. Had the communists done so rather than allocating it to Serbia and Montenegro, Sandzak’s Muslims might have suffered the same fate in 1992 as those of Eastern Bosnia.

Shaping Republika Srpska

Of the decisions taken over Bosnia's internal borders in the 1990s, those relating to the "Republika Srpska" (RS) were mostly felt immediately. The insistence that RS should cover 49% of Bosnia ensured that large areas of Western Bosnia, possibly including RS’s biggest city Banja Luka, were not overrun in 1995 by the Bosnian Croat forces (HVO) or the mainly Muslim Bosnian Army (ARBiH).

The insistence on 49% also ensured that an area around the towns of Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo that had been overrun by the HVO would be returned to the RS, which was obviously of immediate benefit to the Serbs who vacated the area in the face of the Croat advance or were expelled by the Croats, as it meant they could quickly return. It also meant however that a large, though also thinly populated, area around the towns of Glamoc, Bosansko Grahovo and Drvar remained in Croat hands after the war, despite having been overwhelmingly Serb according to the 1991 census. In the same region, the 5^th Corps of the ARBiH was left in control of an area it conquered around the towns of Bosanski Petrovac and Kljuc. This land was of interest to the Muslims because it had had a substantial Muslim population prior to the war. Although Croats had no similar reasons to want to control Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo, holding them would have linked another town they captured that was of interest to them, Jajce (which was 35% Croat before the war), with other Croat-held territories in Western Bosnia.

Important decisions over the border between the RS  and the Muslim-Croat Federation were also taken in relation to Sarajevo. The Serb siege of Sarajevo technically lasted until 1996. Early in that year, Bosnia’s international administrators transferred some of the Serb-held territory around the region to the Muslim-Croat Federation, to link Sarajevo with other Muslim-controlled territories and to create a buffer between the city and the RS. Though in principal a common sense decision, in practice it was poorly implemented, with the immediate effect that there was a mass exodus of Serbs from those territories. The transfer is in contrast to the gradual changeover in Serb-occupied Eastern Slavonia in Croatia, which was not handed over to Croatian control until 1998, ensuring that there was no sudden departure of the Serb population. In the long-term, the decision to transfer the territories around Sarajevo ensures the existence of a cohesive Muslim heartland around a triangle formed by Sarajevo and two other large Bosnian cities, Tuzla and Zenica.

The delayed decision on Brcko

Brcko, a strategically important town in a small “corridor” of territory linking the western and eastern halves of the RS, was under the control of the Serbs at the end of the war but its long-term status was left unresolved ahead of an arbitration process that would last until 1999. In that year it was decided that Brcko would be neither part of the RS nor the Federation. Instead it would be a self-governing district, where laws would be created only at the state (Bosnia) and the district level.  Brcko’s potential as a flashpoint between Muslims and Serbs has been much discussed, but less attention has been paid to the possibility of conflict between the Croats and either of the two other groups. Brcko District is composed not just of the part of the pre-war Brcko municipality that was occupied by the Serbs during the war, but of an even larger portion of territory that was under the control of the ARBiH and its allies in the 108^th Brigade of the HVO. The existence of a common enemy in a fiercely contested area may have kept the Muslims and Croats together, but there were tensions. Testifying at a trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the wartime Muslim mayor of Brcko, Mustafa Ramic, said that there had been a very good relationship between Brcko’s Muslims and the Croat political party, the HDZ, (which won most of the Croat vote in Brcko in the 1990 elections) but that it later turned out that “we were not as close as we might have thought.”

The reason for the tensions was that the territory around Brcko held by the HVO and ARBiH was seen by the Muslims as ARBiH territory, but the Croats disagreed. They sought to establish two of their own municipalities, Ravne-Brcko and Gornje Ravne, around the Croat villages in the municipality, with Ravne-Brcko also to include Spionica, a village in Srebrenik municipality and a small part of Gradacac municipality. Brcko had before the war been earmarked as part of the Croats’ “Croatian Community of Bosanska Posavina”, which encompassed eight municipalities in northern Bosnia, with the separate municipalities Ravno-Brcko and Gornje Ravne  a kind of consolation prize following the Serbs’ establishment of the Brcko corridor. The aspiration died with the creation of Brcko District, but any renewed attempt to link up these territories with the Croat controlled area of Posavina around Orasje and Odzak would bring the Croats into conflict with the Serbs as it would entail cutting their corridor. Conflict between Croats and Muslims over the areas of Brcko not controlled by the Serbs is a more likely possibility.

The cantons

Relations between Muslims and Croats are even more strained in the areas that saw bitter fighting between the two groups during the Bosnian War. The Muslim-Croat Federation that was proclaimed following the end of the Croat-Muslim civil war in 1994 bore little resemblance to the reality, which was that most of the territory not under the control of the Serbs was firmly controlled by either the ARBiH or the HVO. Gradually though, the existence of the Federation began to take effect and the Croats have argued that it has turned them into an embattled minority in a Muslim-dominated state, sparking an exodus of Croats from Bosnia.

At the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995, international mediators decided to divide the Federation into 10 Cantons. Some of these Cantons had a precedent, with the Una Sanska Canton (I) around Bihac and the Tuzla Canton (III) around the city of the same name, for example, corresponding to areas that were under the control of particular ARBiH corps at the end of the war, but others bore little resemblance to the actual control of territory.

The Herzegovina-Neretva Canton (VII) is composed of territories that had been fiercely contested between the HVO and ARBiH. Since 1994 it has been rigidly divided between territories that were under the control of the two armies at the end of hostilities, most notably in the city of Mostar, which is divided into a western half controlled by the Croats and an eastern half dominated by Muslims. The Croats also occupy an enclave surrounded by Muslim territory outside the town of Konjic, a remnant of the war. Hercegovina-Neretva is dominated by the Croats, who view Mostar as the capital of their now-defunct “Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna.” Although it is they who occupy an enclave in Muslim territory in Hercegovina-Neretva, it is the Muslims, isolated from the Muslim heartland around Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zenica, who are the weaker of the two groups in the canton. This has been tempered somewhat by special measures that have been implemented by the international community in Mostar, which the Croats would like to be unified as a Croat-majority city. When the Muslim-Croat war ended in 1994, Mostar was placed under international administration, and though committed to Mostar’s reunification in principle, the international community has implemented power sharing measures to ensure this doesn’t happen under Croat domination.

The other of the “mixed” cantons, Central Bosnia (VI), which like Hercegovina-Neretva  was engulfed by the Croat-Muslim war, was also divided between Croats and Muslims, with the Croat territory including two enclaves surrounded by Muslim territory around the towns of Vitez and Kiseljak. Another Croat-occupied area allocated to the canton, around of the town of Jajce, also became an enclave, though it was surrounded by both Muslim and Serb territory after the Croats were forced to give the Mrkonjic Grad area back to the Serbs. The canton was until recently dominated by Croats, but now has a Bosniak Prime Minister. Two Croat municipalities in the municipality, Kiseljak and Kresevo, have indicated their desire to transfer to the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, which is dominated by Croats. The option of transferring to a mostly Croat canton is not open to Jajce, though it might have been if the Croats had not been forced to return Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo, which separate Jajce from other Croat-held areas in Western Bosnia, to the Serbs. That decision means that Jajce now finds itself in a canton that is increasingly dominated by the Muslims. Kiseljak and Kresevo are also unlikely to be allowed to change cantons, because they are separated from Herzegovina-Neretva Canton’s mainly Croat municipalities by two of its Muslim-dominated municipalities, Konjic and Jablanica, which might also legitimately ask to transfer to Central Bosnia Canton.

Eight of the 10 cantons are ethnically cohesive, with Muslims dominating Sarajevo (IX), Gorazde (V), Tuzla, Una-Sana and Doboj-Zenica (IV) Cantons and Croats predominant in Posavina (II), Western Herzegovina (VII) and Canton 10. Doboj-Zenica at the end of the war included two Croat enclaves resulting from Croat-Muslim fighting at the end of the war, one around the municipality of Zepce and one outside Vares, a town from which the Croat population was expelled by the ARBiH. It also included Usora, an area that had been largely under the control of the HVO’s 110^th Brigade (which remained allied to the ARBiH) during the war. Usora, which the Croats had in 1992 declared as part of the “ Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna”, was turned into a separate municipality in 1998.

The Croats also sought to create a separate municipality in the Tuzla area and to an extent remained interested in this proposal after the creation of Tuzla Canton in 1995. In Tuzla municipality itself, according to some data, the Croats, despite only numbering 16% of Tuzla’s inhabitants were the biggest ethnic group across 50% of the territory. Many of the sparsely populated rural settlements around Tuzla, including villages such as Husino, Breske and Dokanj, were, and still are, mostly Croat. These form the nucleus of the putative “Soli” municipality, which also includes Croat majority villages in neighbouring municipalities; Bistrac in Lukavac municipality and Drijenca in Lopare (now Celic) municipality. But judging by the experience of the Zepce and Usora enclaves in Zenica-Doboj Canton it is doubtful whether such a municipality would do much to prevent the gradual depletion of the Croat population in Tuzla Canton. The same may be true of Ravne-Brcko and Gornje Ravne, Croat islands in a sea of overwhelmingly Muslim territory.

It is the cantons, so unrepresentative of the reality in Bosnia-Herzegovina when they were created at the Dayton negotiations, that may turn out to be the most important factor in shaping Muslim-Croat relations. Three Croat-dominated cantons tried to create an inter-cantonal council in 2008, but faced opposition from Muslims who understandably viewed this as a precursor to the formation of a Croat entity. In a report on the Federation last year, the International Crisis Group said that modifications of cantonal borders, such as combining Croat-dominated Western-Herzegovina and Canton 10, would not change the ethnic balance adding that it could also be applied to Muslim cantons such as Sarajevo and Gorazde. But a merger of Hercegovina-Neretva, Western Herzegovina and Canton 10 would consolidate Croat control of ethnically-mixed Hercegovina-Neretva and a merger of the Central Bosnia Canton with the more heavily Muslim-populated cantons to its east would accelerate Muslim control there. The Croats would be in control of two cohesive areas territorially linked to Croatia. The only barrier to a territorially-linked single Muslim area would be the relatively small area around Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo in the RS; the Serbs would probably be willing to give this up in exchange for more powers for RS or full control over the Brcko corridor. Large numbers of Croats and Muslims would be left in areas controlled by the other ethnic group, but probably not enough to spark another conflict between the two sides. The constitutional arrangements imposed on Bosnia in 1995 may have unwittingly shaped the contours of a three-way partition.

The electoral legacy of the Croat-Muslim conflict

The patterns of ethnic separation – and, in some areas, of continued coexistence – between Muslims and Croats during the Bosnian war of 1992 to 1995 are still very much in evidence today.

While separation between Serbs and both Muslims and Croats was pretty much absolute, Croat-Muslim relations were much more varied and complex. Ethnic strife was most marked in areas where both groups had a strong presence, but in areas where one group substantially outnumbered the other, relations were much better. I discussed this tendency in a previous posting, Croat-Muslim Relations in the Bosnian War: The Demographic Factor.  Results from last year’s election in Bosnia – despite the distorting effects of refugee returns, economic emigration, voting for non-ethnic parties and other variables – indicate its continuation.

Prior to the war, the region now known as the Zenica-Doboj Canton contained large numbers of Muslims, Croats and Serbs. Now, after bitter fighting during the war between the Muslim-dominated Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croat Army the HVO, it is scarcely more ethnically mixed than Tuzla Canton, which prior to the war had a more strongly-concentrated Muslim population.

In Zenica-Doboj, Croat parties won 6.9% of the vote in the Bosnian elections last year. In Tuzla Canton, they won 3.25%, a figure that may appear miniscule, but actually demonstrates that the Croat population has held up relatively well.

A starker contrast can be seen in the municipalities that contain the main cities of each canton. Zenica and Tuzla municipalities were both 16% Croat prior to the war. In Zenica municipality, Croat parties won 3.4% of the vote last year. In Tuzla, they won 6.6%.

The Croat population in Zenica-Doboj Canton is not generally intermingled with the Muslim population.  Stripping out Zepce and Usora municipalities, which are under Croat control, a legacy of the separation between Muslims and Croats in this region during the war, Croat parties won just 4.9% of the vote.

Kakanj, a municipality now in Zenica-Doboj Canton, was 30% Croat in 1991, but the Croats were expelled by the ARBiH during the war; in last year’s election, Croat parties won just 5.2% of the vote. Thus its ethnic composition is now similar to that in the municipalities of Srebrenik and Zivinice, both in Tuzla Canton and both 7% Croat according to the 1991 census, where the Croat parties respectively won 4.9% and 3.8% of the vote last year. The 115^th Brigade of the HVO in the Tuzla region was allied to the ARBiH during the war, preventing a mass exodus of the Croat population.

Bihac, in the overwhelmingly Muslim-dominated region in northwest Bosnia, was 8% Croat before the war and the 101^st Brigade of the HVO throughout the war fought on the side of the ARBiH against the Serbs who surrounded the region. It is not surprising therefore, that there is still a substantial Croat community and that Croat parties won 4.6% of the vote last year.

In Bosnia’s capital Sarajevo, the HVO was forcibly incorporated into the ARBiH during the war, largely as a result of the city’s proximity to central Bosnia, which saw bitter fighting between Croats and Muslims. This may help to explain why, even though, similarly to Bihac, it had a Croat population of 7% before the war, Croat parties could muster just 1.52% of the vote in Sarajevo Canton last year.

A similar pattern of ethnic homogenisation in formerly mixed areas and continued co-existence in more homogenous areas can be seen in Croat-dominated areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The expulsion of Muslims from areas of “Herceg-Bosna” has been well documented, but even in areas that some see as bastions of Croat chauvinism one can see a more complex situation. Livno and Tomislavgrad in west-central Bosnia were overwhelmingly Croat before the war, but had Muslim populations of 15% and 11% respectively. Muslims were mistreated in both municipalities during the war, but not subjected to wholesale ethnic cleansing witnessed in central Bosnia and parts of Herzegovina. Thus there has been a continuous Muslim population in both and identifiably Muslim parties won 9.5% of the vote in Livno last year and 8.6% in Tomislavgrad.

In Orasje in northern Bosnia, 75% Croat and 7% Muslim in 1991, Muslims fought in the HVO throughout the war, but Ljubuski in Herzegovina, 93% Croat and 6% Muslim in 1991, was caught up in the Croat-Muslim struggle for control of the wider region. In last year’s election, identifiably Muslim parties won 11.2% of the vote in Orasje, but 0% of the vote in Ljubuski.

Strangely, it is the areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina that used to be among most ethnically homogenous that have best preserved the vestiges of common life between Muslims and Croats. Towns such as Livno, Orasje and Tomislavgrad are in overwhelmingly Croat regions, but contain large, visible Muslim populations, a legacy of Ottoman times when towns were mostly Muslim and Christians lived in the countryside. Livno’s “Upper Town” was the only Muslim-majority settlement in the municipality of Livno in 1991; the Muslim SDA won most of the vote there last year. In Orasje municipality, where the Muslims nearly made up a majority the town’s inhabitants prior to the war, the SDA was the best performing party in four of the 23 voting areas last year.

In the mostly Muslim areas around Tuzla and Bihac, many of the villages are populated mostly by Croats, who are historically the most rural of Bosnia’s three main ethnic groups. The HDZ was the biggest party more than a dozen of 152 the voting areas in Tuzla last year, including in the villages of Husino, Dokanj and Par Selo, and in two of the four villages in Bihac that were Croat-majority according to the 1991 census, Vedro Polje and Zavalje.

The experience of Bosnia’s Croats and Muslims suggests that in ethnically mixed areas, where one group’s dominance of an area is not demographically challenged by the presence of another group, relations remain harmonious. But once a rival ethnic group reaches a certain percentage of the population, a struggle for political control begins, resulting in expulsion of populations from the losing side. Perhaps an awareness of this tendency could help to prevent future ethnic conflict, not just in Bosnia, but elsewhere in the world.