Probably the most common prediction among Western critics of Putin’s Russia is that if he achieves his aims in Ukraine, he will then turn his attention to the Baltic states.
The idea seems to be that, having successfully intervened in Ukraine, a country with a large Russian speaking population, he would then be emboldened to extend Russian "protection" to Russian speakers in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
But there are some historical differences between Ukraine and the Baltic states, which, judging by comments Putin’s opponents have made about his views on Russia’s role in the world, suggest that he may not be as interested in the Baltic states. One of Putin’s biggest Western critics, the journalist Edward Lucas, believes that Putin is "very keen on ... (the ) Pravoslavny idea," which holds that historically Orthodox Christian countries are part of an eastern civilization that does not lend itself well to Western-style democracy.
This could bode well for the Baltic states because despite their large Russian-speaking populations they are undoubtedly historically Protestant or Catholic rather than Orthodox. If Putin truly regards EU intervention in the Ukraine as an intolerable encroachment in the Orthodox world, he may for the same reason be relaxed about the Baltic states’ membership of the EU and NATO. Russian interference in the Baltics may be a reaction to Western overtures to Orthodox countries such as Georgia and Ukraine rather than a serious attempt to gain influence there.
But Putin’s supposed attachment to the Pravoslavny idea does not mean that further conflict between the West and Russia is unlikely, just that future battlegrounds are likely to be in Orthodox countries rather than Western ones. Western-backed political forces have already come into conflict with Russia in Georgia and Ukraine and could in the future do so in Serbia, Moldova, Belarus and other countries.
The idea seems to be that, having successfully intervened in Ukraine, a country with a large Russian speaking population, he would then be emboldened to extend Russian "protection" to Russian speakers in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
But there are some historical differences between Ukraine and the Baltic states, which, judging by comments Putin’s opponents have made about his views on Russia’s role in the world, suggest that he may not be as interested in the Baltic states. One of Putin’s biggest Western critics, the journalist Edward Lucas, believes that Putin is "very keen on ... (the ) Pravoslavny idea," which holds that historically Orthodox Christian countries are part of an eastern civilization that does not lend itself well to Western-style democracy.
This could bode well for the Baltic states because despite their large Russian-speaking populations they are undoubtedly historically Protestant or Catholic rather than Orthodox. If Putin truly regards EU intervention in the Ukraine as an intolerable encroachment in the Orthodox world, he may for the same reason be relaxed about the Baltic states’ membership of the EU and NATO. Russian interference in the Baltics may be a reaction to Western overtures to Orthodox countries such as Georgia and Ukraine rather than a serious attempt to gain influence there.
But Putin’s supposed attachment to the Pravoslavny idea does not mean that further conflict between the West and Russia is unlikely, just that future battlegrounds are likely to be in Orthodox countries rather than Western ones. Western-backed political forces have already come into conflict with Russia in Georgia and Ukraine and could in the future do so in Serbia, Moldova, Belarus and other countries.
Mr Lucas expressed what may well be the true motivation behind EU policy last year when he wrote of Ukraine that: "The political, economic and cultural success of a large, Orthodox, industrialised ex-Soviet country would be the clearest signal possible to the Russians that their thieving, thuggish, lying rulers are not making the country great, but holding it back." The hope that its eastward advance will ultimately result in the overthrow of Putin rather than the fear that his influence will spread west may be the guiding principle behind EU policy.
Perhaps the EU will succeed in bringing Western-style democracy to the Orthodox world and its yellow-starred flag will one day even fly above a democratically elected Duma. But if Putin really does adhere to the Pravoslavny idea and is only interested in maintaining his grip over Russia and surrounding Orthodox countries, EU countries should ask if it is worth risking further bloody conflict to achieve this aim.
Perhaps the EU will succeed in bringing Western-style democracy to the Orthodox world and its yellow-starred flag will one day even fly above a democratically elected Duma. But if Putin really does adhere to the Pravoslavny idea and is only interested in maintaining his grip over Russia and surrounding Orthodox countries, EU countries should ask if it is worth risking further bloody conflict to achieve this aim.
