The electoral legacy of the Croat-Muslim conflict

The patterns of ethnic separation – and, in some areas, of continued coexistence – between Muslims and Croats during the Bosnian war of 1992 to 1995 are still very much in evidence today.

While separation between Serbs and both Muslims and Croats was pretty much absolute, Croat-Muslim relations were much more varied and complex. Ethnic strife was most marked in areas where both groups had a strong presence, but in areas where one group substantially outnumbered the other, relations were much better. I discussed this tendency in a previous posting, Croat-Muslim Relations in the Bosnian War: The Demographic Factor.  Results from last year’s election in Bosnia – despite the distorting effects of refugee returns, economic emigration, voting for non-ethnic parties and other variables – indicate its continuation.

Prior to the war, the region now known as the Zenica-Doboj Canton contained large numbers of Muslims, Croats and Serbs. Now, after bitter fighting during the war between the Muslim-dominated Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croat Army the HVO, it is scarcely more ethnically mixed than Tuzla Canton, which prior to the war had a more strongly-concentrated Muslim population.

In Zenica-Doboj, Croat parties won 6.9% of the vote in the Bosnian elections last year. In Tuzla Canton, they won 3.25%, a figure that may appear miniscule, but actually demonstrates that the Croat population has held up relatively well.

A starker contrast can be seen in the municipalities that contain the main cities of each canton. Zenica and Tuzla municipalities were both 16% Croat prior to the war. In Zenica municipality, Croat parties won 3.4% of the vote last year. In Tuzla, they won 6.6%.

The Croat population in Zenica-Doboj Canton is not generally intermingled with the Muslim population.  Stripping out Zepce and Usora municipalities, which are under Croat control, a legacy of the separation between Muslims and Croats in this region during the war, Croat parties won just 4.9% of the vote.

Kakanj, a municipality now in Zenica-Doboj Canton, was 30% Croat in 1991, but the Croats were expelled by the ARBiH during the war; in last year’s election, Croat parties won just 5.2% of the vote. Thus its ethnic composition is now similar to that in the municipalities of Srebrenik and Zivinice, both in Tuzla Canton and both 7% Croat according to the 1991 census, where the Croat parties respectively won 4.9% and 3.8% of the vote last year. The 115^th Brigade of the HVO in the Tuzla region was allied to the ARBiH during the war, preventing a mass exodus of the Croat population.

Bihac, in the overwhelmingly Muslim-dominated region in northwest Bosnia, was 8% Croat before the war and the 101^st Brigade of the HVO throughout the war fought on the side of the ARBiH against the Serbs who surrounded the region. It is not surprising therefore, that there is still a substantial Croat community and that Croat parties won 4.6% of the vote last year.

In Bosnia’s capital Sarajevo, the HVO was forcibly incorporated into the ARBiH during the war, largely as a result of the city’s proximity to central Bosnia, which saw bitter fighting between Croats and Muslims. This may help to explain why, even though, similarly to Bihac, it had a Croat population of 7% before the war, Croat parties could muster just 1.52% of the vote in Sarajevo Canton last year.

A similar pattern of ethnic homogenisation in formerly mixed areas and continued co-existence in more homogenous areas can be seen in Croat-dominated areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The expulsion of Muslims from areas of “Herceg-Bosna” has been well documented, but even in areas that some see as bastions of Croat chauvinism one can see a more complex situation. Livno and Tomislavgrad in west-central Bosnia were overwhelmingly Croat before the war, but had Muslim populations of 15% and 11% respectively. Muslims were mistreated in both municipalities during the war, but not subjected to wholesale ethnic cleansing witnessed in central Bosnia and parts of Herzegovina. Thus there has been a continuous Muslim population in both and identifiably Muslim parties won 9.5% of the vote in Livno last year and 8.6% in Tomislavgrad.

In Orasje in northern Bosnia, 75% Croat and 7% Muslim in 1991, Muslims fought in the HVO throughout the war, but Ljubuski in Herzegovina, 93% Croat and 6% Muslim in 1991, was caught up in the Croat-Muslim struggle for control of the wider region. In last year’s election, identifiably Muslim parties won 11.2% of the vote in Orasje, but 0% of the vote in Ljubuski.

Strangely, it is the areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina that used to be among most ethnically homogenous that have best preserved the vestiges of common life between Muslims and Croats. Towns such as Livno, Orasje and Tomislavgrad are in overwhelmingly Croat regions, but contain large, visible Muslim populations, a legacy of Ottoman times when towns were mostly Muslim and Christians lived in the countryside. Livno’s “Upper Town” was the only Muslim-majority settlement in the municipality of Livno in 1991; the Muslim SDA won most of the vote there last year. In Orasje municipality, where the Muslims nearly made up a majority the town’s inhabitants prior to the war, the SDA was the best performing party in four of the 23 voting areas last year.

In the mostly Muslim areas around Tuzla and Bihac, many of the villages are populated mostly by Croats, who are historically the most rural of Bosnia’s three main ethnic groups. The HDZ was the biggest party more than a dozen of 152 the voting areas in Tuzla last year, including in the villages of Husino, Dokanj and Par Selo, and in two of the four villages in Bihac that were Croat-majority according to the 1991 census, Vedro Polje and Zavalje.

The experience of Bosnia’s Croats and Muslims suggests that in ethnically mixed areas, where one group’s dominance of an area is not demographically challenged by the presence of another group, relations remain harmonious. But once a rival ethnic group reaches a certain percentage of the population, a struggle for political control begins, resulting in expulsion of populations from the losing side. Perhaps an awareness of this tendency could help to prevent future ethnic conflict, not just in Bosnia, but elsewhere in the world.