Many people believe that Croatia’s defeat in August 1995 of the
Croatian Serb para-state, ‘Republika Srpska Krajina’ (RSK), prevented a repeat
of the Srebrenica massacre in Bihac, a besieged town in
northwest Bosnia.
This may not be the case. The besieged area around Bihac town was much larger than the Srebrenica enclave had been and was mostly territory that had always been nearly 100% Bosniak (Muslim). The pre-war Serb population in Bihac municipality was significant, but in Cazin, the municipality north of Bihac, it was less than 1%. Further north, the Serbs were propping up Fikret Abdic, a local Bosniak politician who had broken away from the Sarajevo leadership to establish an “autonomous province” around Velika Kladusa, another overwhelmingly Bosniak municipality. These municipalities were of little interest to the Serbs.
This may not be the case. The besieged area around Bihac town was much larger than the Srebrenica enclave had been and was mostly territory that had always been nearly 100% Bosniak (Muslim). The pre-war Serb population in Bihac municipality was significant, but in Cazin, the municipality north of Bihac, it was less than 1%. Further north, the Serbs were propping up Fikret Abdic, a local Bosniak politician who had broken away from the Sarajevo leadership to establish an “autonomous province” around Velika Kladusa, another overwhelmingly Bosniak municipality. These municipalities were of little interest to the Serbs.
Referring to the Serb attack on Bihac of late 1994, the VRS
general in charge of the operation, Manojlo Milovanovic, claimed in an
interview that he was ordered not to take Bihac town. This is in keeping with the
previously stated Serb objective to establish the border of the Serb state on
the Una, a river that runs through Bihac. One of the Serbs' main objectives was to control the
strategically important railway line that ran from the main Bosnian Serb controlled city Banja Luka to the
RSK ‘capital’ Knin via the outskirts of Bihac, and also linked the two limbs of the RSK.
The situation was similar in August 1995 when the Serbs, who
had captured Srebrenica the previous month, turned their attention to Bihac.
They were again supporting Fikret Abdic, who had been reinstalled in Velika
Kladasa in late 1994 having been ejected from the region by the Bihac-based 5th
Corps of the ARBiH (Bosnian Army) earlier in the year. Given that his forces
joined the Serbs in their attack on the 5th Corps, it seems possible
that had they succeeded in defeating the 5th Corps they would have
left Abdic in control of Velika Kladusa, Cazin and part of Bihac, including the
town. It is possible that the Abdic forces would have massacred soldiers and
civilians if they had taken control of Bihac. It is also possible that the
Serbs would have preferred to enter Bihac town themselves and committed atrocities
worse than the Srebrenica massacre the previous month. Perhaps they also would
not have tolerated the presence of a densely populated island of Bosniak
territory wedged between the RSK and the Republika Srpska and cast Abdic aside
once he was no longer useful to them, emptying Cazin and Velika Kladusa of its
Bosniak population.
But the other possibility, that they may have left Abdic in long-term control of Cazin, Velika Kladusa and part of Bihac municipality, including the town, seems to have been given very little consideration.
But the other possibility, that they may have left Abdic in long-term control of Cazin, Velika Kladusa and part of Bihac municipality, including the town, seems to have been given very little consideration.