Many people believe that Croatia’s defeat in August 1995 of the
Croatian Serb para-state, ‘Republika Srpska Krajina’ (RSK), prevented a repeat
of the Srebrenica massacre in Bihac, a besieged town in
northwest Bosnia.
This may not be the case. The besieged area around Bihac town was much larger than the Srebrenica enclave had been and was mostly territory that had always been nearly 100% Bosniak (Muslim). The pre-war Serb population in Bihac municipality was significant, but in Cazin, the municipality north of Bihac, it was less than 1%. Further north, the Serbs were propping up Fikret Abdic, a local Bosniak politician who had broken away from the Sarajevo leadership to establish an “autonomous province” around Velika Kladusa, another overwhelmingly Bosniak municipality. These municipalities were of little interest to the Serbs.
This may not be the case. The besieged area around Bihac town was much larger than the Srebrenica enclave had been and was mostly territory that had always been nearly 100% Bosniak (Muslim). The pre-war Serb population in Bihac municipality was significant, but in Cazin, the municipality north of Bihac, it was less than 1%. Further north, the Serbs were propping up Fikret Abdic, a local Bosniak politician who had broken away from the Sarajevo leadership to establish an “autonomous province” around Velika Kladusa, another overwhelmingly Bosniak municipality. These municipalities were of little interest to the Serbs.
Referring to the Serb attack on Bihac of late 1994, the VRS
general in charge of the operation, Manojlo Milovanovic, claimed in an
interview that he was ordered not to take Bihac town. This is in keeping with the
previously stated Serb objective to establish the border of the Serb state on
the Una, a river that runs through Bihac. One of the Serbs' main objectives was to control the
strategically important railway line that ran from the main Bosnian Serb controlled city Banja Luka to the
RSK ‘capital’ Knin via the outskirts of Bihac, and also linked the two limbs of the RSK.
The situation was similar in August 1995 when the Serbs, who
had captured Srebrenica the previous month, turned their attention to Bihac.
They were again supporting Fikret Abdic, who had been reinstalled in Velika
Kladasa in late 1994 having been ejected from the region by the Bihac-based 5th
Corps of the ARBiH (Bosnian Army) earlier in the year. Given that his forces
joined the Serbs in their attack on the 5th Corps, it seems possible
that had they succeeded in defeating the 5th Corps they would have
left Abdic in control of Velika Kladusa, Cazin and part of Bihac, including the
town. It is possible that the Abdic forces would have massacred soldiers and
civilians if they had taken control of Bihac. It is also possible that the
Serbs would have preferred to enter Bihac town themselves and committed atrocities
worse than the Srebrenica massacre the previous month. Perhaps they also would
not have tolerated the presence of a densely populated island of Bosniak
territory wedged between the RSK and the Republika Srpska and cast Abdic aside
once he was no longer useful to them, emptying Cazin and Velika Kladusa of its
Bosniak population.
But the other possibility, that they may have left Abdic in long-term control of Cazin, Velika Kladusa and part of Bihac municipality, including the town, seems to have been given very little consideration.
But the other possibility, that they may have left Abdic in long-term control of Cazin, Velika Kladusa and part of Bihac municipality, including the town, seems to have been given very little consideration.
7 comments:
Check ARS manpower numbers for the summer 95, apply this to the length of their front line and compare with other warring parties numbers. Srebrenica massacre was nothing more and nothing less than a calculated military plan to reduce ABIH mobilization capacity. ARS general staff was brutal but not stupid. Yeah, they will say now that this was just a local para-forces incident. No way. Event of such a magnitude can not be executed without the top. Imagine only logistical effort involved... Bihac was saved for sure.
Thanks for your comment. It's an interesting point. My impression is that there has been little serious effort by the ICTY and others to properly evaluate the motives for the Srebrenica massacre. But I also think there may be something in the ICTY explanation, that the Srebrenica massacre was intended to reduce the Bosniak population in eastern Bosnia. Such motivations do not seem to have been applicable to Bihac. There are many questions that need to be asked about what might have happened in Bihac had the the 5th Corps surrendered. What would have been the role of Abdic's forces? Did the Serbs only intend to occupy Bihac town or other parts of the pocket as well? Without knowing the answers to these and several other questions I don't think we can know whether Bihac really was saved from a massacre similar to that in Srebrenica the previous month.
Well, if you frame the question of what would have followed in the Bihać enclave had it been captured by the VRS in August 1995 in terms of 'would there have been a repeat of the Srebrenica Massacre' it may be helpful to specify what scale of atrocities you believe this event involved so that we may know exactly what question it is we are pondering. Potentially the answer to the question of how likely a repeat of the Srebrenica Massacre was in Bihać in 1995 depends on how large a massacre do you believe it to have been.
I wonder what evidence is there to suggest the same sort of events would have taken place in the case of hypothetical capture of Bihać by the VRS as they did in Srebrenica? Is the only parallel that Bihać was a Bosnian Muslim-held enclave which found itself under some form of offensive action by the VRS, or do similarities go further? I ask because Srebrenica was not the only Bosnian Muslim enclave to ever fall to the VRS. Just weeks after they had captured Srebrenica they would go on to capture Žepa, without there subsequently emerging any horror stories from there to rival those from Srebrenica.
So if it turns out that there were no more parallels between the Bihać and Srebrenica situations than there were betwen the Bihać and Žepa situations, then why is it the question is not instead 'had Bihać fallen would events follow much as they did in Žepa'?
Also allegedly at Srebrenica the attitudes of local VRS troops toward the members of the ARBiH 28th Division were considerably worse than those of VRS troops not local to the area. Assuming this was in fact the case this would have likely played a role in the subsequent events following the capture of Srebrenica by the VRS. So one question that would be worthwhile to ask is was the enmity between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims in the Bosnian Krajina area comparable to the enmity felt by them in Eastern Bosnia around Srebrenica, or was it somewhat less, with the region around Srebrenica being an outlier in this respect?
But I also think there may be something in the ICTY explanation, that the Srebrenica massacre was intended to reduce the Bosniak population in eastern Bosnia
Is a massacre really necessary to reduce a population of a given area or will expulsions work just as well?
The Serbs entered Srebrenica town in July 1995 and captured and killed many men. I still think there is a legitimate debate to be had about the scale and nature of the massacre, but even without knowing in precise detail what happened there, I think it is reasonable to surmise that if the Serbs had not entered Bihac town, which seems possible, there would not have been a massacre on a par with the events in Srebrenica. Bihac's fate would also have been different to Zepa's because it would not have been taken over by the Serbs. But I think you are right to raise the possibility that events in Bihac would have resembled those in Zepa if the Serbs had moved into the town.
"Is a massacre really necessary to reduce a population of any given area or will expulsions work just as well?" Well, I think the ICTY has argued that the Serbs wanted to make sure the men couldn't come back to Srebrenica and surrounding areas and I think there may be something in this, as I said in my response to "Anonymous."
Rory Gallivan said: "there has been little serious effort by the ICTY and others to properly evaluate the motives for the Srebrenica massacre."
You're wrong. You can find motives in the Srebrenica massacre in the hatred that Serbian media and cultural institutions (SANU) propagated to ordinary Serbs for decades, and especially during the war. Bosniaks (and Muslims in general) were painted as cockroaches and blamed for everything bad that happened to the Serbs. There was also a large scale campaign of lies against Naser Oric and Muslims in general who sought safety in the enclave. Also, there were many lies about atrocities against the Serbs, for example, refer to this article in Serbian Vecernje Novosti newspaper http://goo.gl/W1HVn . As a result, illiterate Serb peasants in villages around Srebrenica hated anyone who is Muslim even more. Having conditioned ordinary Serbs to hate their neighbours, what else would you expect after the fall of this enclave?
Why are you questioning Srebrenica so much? Why are you saying that nature of the massacre has to be evaluated? Do you deny that Srebrenica massacre -- systematic killing of 8000 boys and men -- constituted genocide?
And, to make a point, yes -- it is true that the Operation "Storm" was direct consequence of the 1995 Srebrenica Genocide. Peter Galbraight confirmed this recently, read here http://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/peter-galbraith-zbog-srebrenice-smo-dopustili-hrvatima-oluju-clanak-478167
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