The siege of Sarajevo was an important factor in the
Croat-Muslim war of 1993 to 1994.
Although it was a conflict between the mostly Muslim Bosnian
Army (ARBiH) and the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA), the Sarajevo siege was close to
areas of Herzegovina and central Bosnia with mixed Croat and Muslim populations.
As was discussed in a previous post, “Confusion over
Konjic”, relations between the Bosnian Croat army, known as the Croatian
Defence Council (HVO), and the ARBiH, in the northern Herzegovinian
municipality of Konjic became strained in mid-1992 when the HVO refused to join
ARBiH actions aimed at lifting the siege of Sarajevo.
As Croat-Muslim relations worsened, Hadzici, prior to the
war one of the 10 Sarajevo municipalities, became drawn into the dispute
between the two groups. In January 1993, ARBiH commander Sefer Halilovic warned
the commander of the Herzegovina-based 4th Brigade of the ARBIH of “cadres”
from the ARBiH and the MUP (interior ministry) in Konjic and neighbouring
Hadzici who had put themselves in the service of “Greater Croatian” politics.
Hadzici was significant in this regard because although the Croat population
there was tiny, the main road from Mostar, seen by the Bosnian Croats as their
capital, to Kiseljak, a Croat-majority municipality in central Bosnia, ran
through it.
In March 1993, ARBiH forces from Hadzici, who were part of the Sarajevo-based 1st Corp of the ARBiH, were involved
in an attack on the HVO aimed at taking control of a military facility in
Konjic, in northern Herzegovina.
ARBiH forces from Hadzici were also involved in the
Croat-Muslim conflict in central Bosnia. Fighting between the Croats and
Muslims in Kiseljak and Kresevo, municipalities that before the war had Croat
majorities, started in January 1993 and was initially concentrated on their
western fringes. Later in the year, the fighting shifted to the south and east
of Kiseljak and Kresevo, which by that time formed a Croat-controlled enclave
surrounded by ARBiH territory.
In late June, the ARBiH began targeting Kresevo, an attack
that involved the ARBiH 3rd Corps, which covered central Bosnia, and
elements of the Sarajevo-based 1st Corps. The ARBiH failed to take
Kresevo and shifted their attack west to the town of Fojnica. These actions
seemingly involved the 9th Mountain Brigade from Hadzici and the 4th
Motorised Brigade from Ilidza, another Sarajevo municipality. Fojnica fell to
the ARBiH in early July.
After Fojnica fell, the ARBiH’s actions against the Kiseljak
enclave were largely linked to efforts to lift the siege of Sarajevo. The Croat
enclave around Kiseljak, while mostly surrounded by ARBiH territory, also
bordered territory controlled by the VRS forces that were besieging Sarajevo;
the Croats in Kiseljak had a cordial relationship with the VRS and the
frontline was peaceful. The ARBiH wanted
to break this connection and control all of the road, part of which was already
controlled by the 9th Mountain Brigade of the ARBiH 1st
Corps, between Han Ploca (in Kiseljak municipality) and Tarcin (in Hadzici) so
they could attack the VRS and smash the siege of Sarajevo. The HVO wanted
Kiseljak to stay out what they saw as a Serb-Muslim conflict. Fighting in this
area continued periodically until the end of the Croat-Muslim war in March
1994. The Muslims never managed to break the connection between HVO- and
VRS-held territory.
As in other parts of Bosnia, the ARBiH-HVO conflict in
Kiseljak may not have been so much about one group’s desire to control the
territory and expel all inhabitants belonging to the other group as about the
two groups’ wholly different war aims in relation to the Serbs. The Croats had
no dispute with the Serbs over territory in this region, unlike the Muslims,
who were desperate to lift the siege of Sarajevo. As Charles Shrader writes in “The
Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia”: “Had the ABiH offensives in the
Kiseljak area succeeded, which they did in part, the Muslims would have linked
the II, III and VII Corps to the north with the I, IV and VI Corps to the
south, saving about a hundred kilometres over the Zenica-Novi Travnik-Gornji
Vakuf route.”
Despite the atrocities and ethnic cleansing committed by
both sides, the Croats and the Muslims each had understandable strategic aims
in Kiseljak and it was the incompatibility of these, rather than any particular
sinister objectives of one side, that was largely responsible for the conflict
in this area.
4 comments:
Did the Croats of the Kiseljak enclave also assign added importance to the territory under their control where they bordered Bosnian Serb-controlled territory? Did they see it as a strategic imperative to maintain direct land access to the Bosnian Serbs?
I'm not sure but I think the answer to both questions is no.
"The Croats in Kiseljak had a cordial relationship with the VRS and the frontline was peaceful... "
- Of course. They had the similar goals (Greater Croatia and Greater Serbia) and common enemy (the Boniaks, or -- as you offensively refer to us as ethnic "Muslims").
"The Muslims never managed to break the connection between HVO- and VRS-held territory."
- Because of arms embargo. That's why.
I use "Muslim" when refering to 1992, because that was the term in use then. When refering to the present day, I use "Bosniak".
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